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ABSTRACT
The use of Convolutional Neural Networks (CNN) to estimate the galaxy photometric
redshift probability distribution by analysing the images in different wavelength bands
has been developed in the recent years thanks to the rapid development of the Machine
Learning (ML) ecosystem. Authors have set-up CNN architectures and studied their
performances and some sources of systematics using standard methods of training
and testing to ensure the generalisation power of their models. So far so good, but one
piece was missing : does the model generalisation power is well measured? The present
article shows clearly that very small image perturbations can fool the model completely
and opens the Pandora’s box of adversarial attack. Among the different techniques
and scenarios, we have chosen to use the Fast Sign Gradient one-step Method and
its Projected Gradient Descent iterative extension as adversarial generator tool kit.
However, as unlikely as it may seem these adversarial samples which fool not only a
single model, reveal a weakness both of the model and the classical training. A revisited
algorithm is shown and applied by injecting a fraction of adversarial samples during
the training phase. Numerical experiments have been conducted using a specific CNN
model for illustration although our study could be applied to other models - not only
CNN ones - and in other contexts - not only redshift measurements - as it deals with
the complexity of the boundary decision surface.
Key words: galaxies: distances and redshifts - surveys - techniques:photometric
redshifts - methods: data analysis - statistical
1 INTRODUCTION
The outcomes of forthcoming very large optical surveys as
LSST (Ivezic´ et al. 2008; Ivezic´ et al. 2019) or red-optical
and infrared surveys as Euclid (Laureijs et al. 2011) will de-
pend crucially up on the galaxy 1 positions on the sky and
especially along the light of sight, i.e. the redshift. As the ac-
curate spectroscopic redshift determinations are costly and
time consuming such that they are limited to sub-samples
of galaxies as in BOSS (SDSS-III) (Alam et al. 2015) and
eBOSS (SDSS-IV) (Dawson et al. 2016) and the future DESI
(Levi et al. 2013) or Euclid (spectro sub-sample) surveys, the
majority of the galaxy redshifts of past surveys as DES Y1
(Samuroff et al. 2019) and future as LSST and Euclid rely
on the photometric measurements. The reconstruction per-
formances of photometric redshift (hereafter named photo-z
or zphot) has been extensively studied in the literature since
? Email: campagne@lal.in2p3.fr
1 The galaxies are not the only objects that will be catalogued
and the conclusion to our study can nicely be generalized.
the work of (Baum 1962) with different kinds of methods
such as template-fitting, feature based machine learning and
image based machine learning.
The template-fitting methods, first developped by (Loh
& Spillar 1986), have been used for instance in the refer-
ences (Arnouts et al. 1999; Ben´ıtez 2000; Feldmann et al.
2006; Brammer et al. 2008) and recently in (Gorecki et al.
2014; Ansari et al. 2019). For a given galaxy, the algorithm
matches the magnitude distributions in the different filter
wide bands (e.g. ugriz ) to a suite of interpolate spectral en-
ergy distributions from few known galaxies and it results a
photo-z value and error in a fully probabilistic fashion with
explicit priors.
The feature based machine learning methods use differ-
ent types of tools as Decision Trees (DT; Quinlan (1986)),
Random Forests (RF; Breiman (2001)), Support Vector Ma-
chine (SVM; Boser et al. (1992)), k-nearest neighbors (KNN;
Altman (1992)) as well as Muti-Perceptron Layers (nick-
named either MLP or ANN; Werbos (1974); Rumelhart et al.
(1986)). They have been used for instance in the references
(Collister & Lahav 2004; Wadadekar 2005; Carrasco Kind &
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Brunner 2013; Sadeh et al. 2016; Beck et al. 2016; Ansari
et al. 2019). These methods use as input for a given galaxy
the different magnitudes (or colors) measured in the differ-
ent filters augmented eventually by other user driven in-
formation, and give as output a single photo-z value or a
probability density distribution (p.d.f). But contrary to the
template-fitting methods, the prediction is based on the de-
termination of the internal parameters of each tool during a
supervised preliminary phase, where a sub-sample of galax-
ies with known redshifts are processed. The later redshifts
considered as the true values are mostly known thanks to
the accurate spectroscopic measurements. The feature based
machine learning methods have shown better prediction ac-
curacy than the template-fitting methods although a com-
bination of the two class of methods has been investigated
for instance in reference (Cavuoti et al. 2017). The feature
based machine learning methods rely explicitly on manual
feature extractions that may not capture all the information
present in the images: for example the point spread function
(PSF) variations are problematic (Hildebrandt et al. 2012;
Jime´nez-Teja et al. 2015; Pasquet et al. 2019).
The last type of methods, i.e. image based machine
learning, have been investigated to overcome these draw-
backs, and their popularity has grown in the recent years
thanks to the Machine Learning ecosystem developments.
Notably, the success of the deep convolutional neural net-
works (CNN) since the pioneer work at the end of the 80’s
and the 90’s (LeCun et al. 1990; Lecun & Bengio 1995; Le-
Cun et al. 1998) has dramatically changed the paradigm in
many fields among the computer vision (image and video
classification, segmentation), the speech recognition, the
natural language treatment (LeCun et al. 2015). In brief,
a CNN is a feed-forward neural network with two main
parts: the first one is composed of several blocks of con-
volutional layers followed by sub-sampling layers, while the
second one is composed of fully connected (or dense) lay-
ers from which the last layer gives the desired output (e.g.
redshift p.d.f). As it is common to say, during the training
phase, the first part somewhat learns the optimal feature
representation which replaces the manual features extraction
of the previous methods, while the second part is the clas-
sifier. For photometric redshift predictions, one can read for
intance the following references (D’Isanto & Polsterer 2018;
Pasquet et al. 2019). Notice that in astronomy CNNs have
been also used for other tasks as image processing task (e.g.
Flamary (2016)) among which the deblending (e.g. Reiman
& Go¨hre (2019); Burke et al. (2019)), and also object clas-
sifications (e.g. Kim & Brunner (2017); Pasquet-Itam, J. &
Pasquet, J. (2018); Gonza´lez et al. (2018)).
The image based machine learning methods for photo-
metric redshift predictions do suffer from systematics among
which some are shared with other supervised methods as the
representativeness quality and size of the training samples
and the quality of the input information. The later source
of systematics are closely related to the images themselves
which may influence the prediction: for instance the presence
or not of neighbouring objects even if there do not blend the
central object, the possible orientation of the object, its pos-
sible non central position, the non uniformity of the PSF,
the different filter response calibrations, and so on. All these
source of systematics are of course relevant, but this article
is motivated by the existence of intrinsic perturbations of the
images that can fool the classifier prediction, i.e the photo-
metric redshift p.d.f as discussed in the present article. The
subject known as adversarial examples in the ML literature
has been first studied by (Szegedy et al. 2013; Goodfellow
et al. 2014), it was one of the challenges proposed during the
NIPS ’17 Competition (Kurakin et al. 2018a; Kurakin et al.
2018b) and it gave rise to communications in later NISP
conferences as it is an important subject on ML robustness
and security2.
Contrary to the expected good generalisation power
of trained machine learning models with good practices
and with good representativeness of the different train-
ing/testing/validation sets, the adversarial examples show
dramatic prediction failures while the perturbations of the
inputs are so tiny that one expects very marginal impacts.
Unfortunately, this is not the case and it has been realised
that one should envisage countermeasures. The different
scenarios studied in the ML literature are: target or non-
target attack which distinguishes between image perturba-
tions that fool the model predictions either by forcing the
model towards a predefined redshift value either just by forc-
ing the model to not-predict the correct redshift; and de-
pending on the knowledge of the architecture of the model,
one qualifies the attack as white box -like (full knowledge) or
black box -like (no real knowledge of the model). Put in the
context of photometric redshift predictions, we think that
target attacks are not to be envisaged in our case as if there
exist input perturbations that fool the model, we do not
think that they are so malicious. Concerning white versus
black box scenarios, we think that white box ones are valu-
able as they give us some chance to propose a new training
method that leads to better immunity against image per-
turbations. However, it will be shown a black box like effect
using adversarial examples of a model given as inputs to a
different model architecture.
The present article is organised as followed. Section 2
summarises the data and CNN models used. Essentially, we
are using the Inception CNN proposed in reference (Pasquet
et al. 2019) which has shown good redshift prediction per-
formances and serves as reference for our studies. We have
also chosen this CNN model because the present article is
rather a proof of concept which needs a CNN of known ar-
chitecture details with good performances, well trained in
the classic sense and the possibility to use the same set of
input data. Section 3 introduces the adversarial image gen-
eration and shows their dramatic effects, and explains what
are the effects of these samples telling us about? Then, in
Section 4 a new training algorithm is detailed as well as the
performances of Inception retrained model depending on the
adversarial generator even if the outcomes are not perfect.
Finally, in Section 5 we summarize our main results.
2 DATA AND CNN MODEL
The numerical experiments undertaken in this article rely
mostly on the model and data used in (Pasquet et al.
2019) and we only briefly introduce these key ingredients.
2 See https://nicholas.carlini.com/writing/2019/
all-adversarial-example-papers.html to get an idea of
the literature growth about this subject.
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Figure 1. Examples of the 5× 64× 64 pixel cube as input of the
CNN. For each imaged galaxy we show the ugriz filter responses
and on top the zspec value as well as the E(B − V ) redenning
correction. Each series of filter frames has its own LUT shown on
the right side.
Figure 2. Example of the distribution of the pixel values of the
five filter patches of a single image with in orange the values of
the central galaxy pixels located at z = 0.27.
The data are originated from the SDSS multi-band imag-
ing and spectroscopic redshift survey using a dedicated 2.5-
meter telescope at Apache Point Observatory in New Mex-
ico. The authors used the data release 12 (DR12; Alam et al.
(2015)) from which has been extracted the sources classified
as galaxy with spectroscopic redshifts mostly in the [0, 0.3]
range. The ’corrected frames’ image of the SDSS ugriz filters
of data release 8 have been treated by the authors using the
SWARP code3 (Bertin et al. 2002) to resample to a common
pixelgrid and stack all the available image data. It results of
a 5 × 64 × 64 pixel cube centred on the galaxy coordinates
(Fig. 1). The pixel values are float values possibly negative,
this is in contrast to usual RGB images used in general by
ML designers (eg. CIFAR images for data challenges 4). An
example is shown in Fig. 2. Besides the images, the E(B−V )
(’ebv’ variable) redenning correction in magnitudes at the
position of each object is also used as extra variable given
to the fully connected part of the network.
Concerning the CNN architecture, the authors have
used an Inception model inspired from GoogleLeNet
3 http://astromatic.net/software/swarp
4 https://www.cs.toronto.edu/ kriz/cifar.html
(Szegedy et al. 2014). Originally, GoogleLeNet has been used
for the ImageNet Large-Scale Visual Recognition Challenge
2014 and the architecture was motivated by mainly the fol-
lowing arguments: first, to deal with size and location varia-
tions of the information in the input image, one needs small
kernel size for localized information and larger kernel for
more distributed information; second, very deep networks
are more prone to overfitting, so one needs to keep the net-
work as short as possible; third, stacking a lot of convolution
layers tends to be computationally intensive, this also tends
to keep the network as short as possible. These arguments
remains true concerning the information variations, and also
if the hardware and algorithmic codes have been improved
since 2014 and allows very deep architecture as the Resnet
series (He et al. 2015), for this study keeping architecture
simple is suited to feed a single GPU and keep the training
phase in reasonable time-scale (i.e. not larger than 48 hours).
But, anticipating to the result of the Section 4, one has to
keep in mind that the classification power of the network
also has to be taken into account to design the architecture.
So, the model of Pasquet et al. (2019) is composed of
a 5 × 5 kernel convolutional layer followed by a series of 5
inception cells with 1×1, 3×3 and 5×5 kernels, and finally
a pair of fully connected layers to transform the learned
features into a prediction. Instead of using a max pooling
layer after a convolution due to possible large single pixel
intensity variations, one prefers to use average pooling. The
activation functions for the fully connected layers are ReLU,
while for the convolutional layer one applies a PReLU ac-
tivation with a learnable parameter. Some details upon the
size of the different layers are given in Appendix A. In Sec-
tion 4, we examine some modifications of this model. The
inputs are typically batches of 64 samples5 and the output
is a vector of 180 bins to sample photometric redshift p.d.f
prediction taking into account that zspec ∈ [0, 1] (i.e. the bin
width is 5.5×10−3 small enougth to sample the photometric
redshift p.d.f6).
For comparison purpose, a simpler CNN has been set-up
consisting of 1 convolutional 5× 5 kernel layer followed by 2
convolutional 3×3 kernel layers and 2 fully connected layers.
Details can be seen on Appendix A. Notice that the ’ebv’
variable is also used at the entrance of fully connected part
of the network. This simpler CNN model gives satisfactory
results compared to the Inception model, but it was not
intended to outperform the later.
As in the following sections we need to train the differ-
ent models in different configurations, so we could not use
the pre-trained Inception model available on github7, and
we have used the latest pyTorch library8 v1.3.0 (Obermeyer
et al. 2019) from which we have changed the default weight
initialisations into the Xavier’s uniform method and the bias
are initialised to 0.1, to follow initialisation conditions used
by Pasquet et al. (2019) .
For the minimisation process we use the cross-entropy
5 It is implicit that a sample is composed of the collection of the
ugriz filter datacubes associated with the ’ebv’ variables.
6 Pasquet et al. (2019) use a bin width of 2.2 × 10−3 but the
redshift p.d.f sampling is not affected by a larger bin width as it
is shown on Fig. 5.
7 https://github.com/jpasquet/photoz
8 https://pytorch.org/
4 J.E Campagne
loss between the CNN output (i.e. the 180 bins vector) and
the spectroscopic redshift value converted to a hot vector
of same size9. Concerning the optimiser, we have performed
numerical studies with the traditional SGD (Sutskever et al.
2013) and Adam codes (Kingma & Ba 2014), as well as the
recent Adam improvement code (Loshchilov & Hutter 2017)
called AdamW which is available in pyTorch since version
1.2.0. Notice that both for Adam and AdamW, we have set
the -parameter to 0.1 − 1.0 values much higher than the
default value (i.e. 10−8), first because it is recommended for
Inception architecture in the TensorFlow library, and second
by our own experience below 0.01 the training manifests
large instabilities. The initial learning rate is typically set to
0.01, and we have used a reduce learning rate scheduler to
decrease by 20% the learning rate if after 5 or 10 epochs the
test accuracy has not been improved.
From the initial 659 857 input samples, after random
shuffling, we have set-up different sets of 100 000 samples,
one common for the test set and several for different training
sets, and also a different set of 10 000 samples for the adver-
sarial test experiments. After been gathered in batches, we
randomly apply a combination of geometrical transforma-
tions such as horizontal and vertical flips and 90◦, 180◦ and
270◦ rotations. The number of training epochs is typically
150, but first sometimes the minimization has required early
stopping and relaunching with a different optimiser settings,
and second we have pushed up to 300 epochs for some spe-
cial training tests. All the numerical experiments have been
conducted at the CC-IN2P310 GPU-Nvidia farm from which
a single Tesla V100 is used at a time.
3 ADVERSARIAL IMAGES GENERATION
3.1 Classical training of Inception model
First of all, an Inception model, nickname hereafter Iref
has been trained ”classically”, that is to say using a pair of
train/test sets and tuning the optimizer hyper-parameters
to get the training and testing losses as close as possible
up to an epoch where the network starts to overfit, that is
to say when the test loss increases while the train loss still
decreases. The results are presented in terms of the distri-
bution of the variable δz = (zphot−zspec)/(1+zspec) (Fig. 3
top) and the zphot versus zspec comparison (Fig. 3 bottom).
For the sake of comparison between different numerical ex-
periments, we have used the following variables:
• the bias defined as the mean of the δz distribution;
• the σMAD = 1.4826× |δz −Median(δz)|;
• and the fraction η of outliers such that |δz| > 0.05.
The results concerning Iref are presented on Tab. 1 and for
the ”classical” training with non perturbed images (i.e. non
adversarial images) the reader should have a look at the
line ’non perturbed’. The obtained results are satisfactory
enough and comparable with the ones obtained in (Pasquet
9 That is to say a vector of length 180, with all the components
set to 0, except the one corresponding to the zspec value which is
set to 1.
10 https://cc.in2p3.fr/en/
Figure 3. Results obtained with the the reference Inception
model trained and tested with unperturbed images: (top) dis-
tribution of the δz variable; (bottom) zphot versus zspec.
et al. 2019), so it can serve as a rather good reference starting
point.
3.2 Adversarial samples
Let us now get a brief introduction to adversarial samples
generation. In a classical supervised training, the parameters
θ of a model f are adjusted to minimise an empirical risk,
thanks to the set of {xi, zi}i≤N ∈ Dtrain samples, where
xi is an input image
11 and zi is the spectroscopic redshift
considered as the true value. The expression of the empirical
risk is
Re(fθ, Dtrain) =
1
|Dtrain|
∑
(x,z)∼Dtrain
`(fθ(x), z)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
`(fθ(xi), zi). (1)
with ` the cross-entropy loss function. Depending on the
optimizer (SGD, Adam, and so on), the algorithm is different
but for the sake of definiteness and illustration, we use here a
Batched Gradient Descent method where (x, z) samples are
gathered on batches named Btrain. After an initialisation
11 Notice that the ’ebv’ variable is implicitly added but it remains
unperturbed in the following numerical experiments.
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phase, the values of the θ parameters are updated step-by-
step as:
θt+1 = θt − α 1|Btrain|
∑
(x,z)∼Btrain
[∇θ`(fθ(x), z)]θ=θt (2)
with α the learning rate. Now, the adversarial samples are
images to which is added a small amount, noted δ according
to
Radv,e(fθ, Dtrain) =
1
|Dtrain|
∑
(x,z)∼Dtrain
[
max
‖δ‖≤ε
`(fθ(x+ δ), z)
]
. (3)
The minimisation of Radv,e to get the θ parameters needs
to solve a minimax problem also known as a saddle point
problem, with an inner maximization part included in the
more familiar outer minimisation part.
The maximisation problem leads to several kinds of
methods that generate adversarial examples. Such kind of
generating method is called an attack in the literature and
we occasionally use this terminology later on. The first
method, called the Fast Sign Gradient Method (FSGM), has
been proposed in (Goodfellow et al. 2014) and more elabo-
rated attacks are detailed for instance in the following ref-
erences (Kurakin et al. 2016; Yuan et al. 2017; Madry et al.
2017; Kurakin et al. 2018b; Kurakin et al. 2018a; Ilyas et al.
2019). In the following, we briefly summarize the FSGM
attack which is simple and powerful, as well as one of its
generalisation, i.e. the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD)12
iterative method which is more aggressive.
3.3 The FSGM one-step generator
The solution of the maximisation problem (Eq. 3) is noted
δ∗, it generally depends on x and satisfies:
δ∗(x) = argmax
‖δ‖≤ε
`(fθ(x+ δ), z). (4)
The maximisation ensures that perturbations smaller than
δ∗ in terms of the norm used, have smaller impact on the
model predictions. In the following, the infinity norm (L∞)
is used as it gives good results, but for the sake of com-
pleteness a numerical experiment has been conducted with
the L2 norm
13 giving more sparse perturbations14. In case
of the infinity norm ‖δ‖∞ ≤ ε and under some hypothesis
mentioned later, the solution reads:
δ∗(x) = ε× sign (∇δ`(fθ(x+ δ), z)) (5)
from which the FSGM name is originated, i.e. Fast Sign
Gradient Method.
To see the impact of such perturbation added to image
x, we have first conducted a numerical study to determined
ε. When adding a random uniform noise to an original image
x, i.e. δ(x) ∼ U [−,+], if ε = 0.01 there is absolutely no ef-
fect on the generalisation power of Iref (i.e. the bias, σMAD
12 This method is also called Basic Iterative Method in the liter-
ature.
13 As a remainder, consdering a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn,
‖x‖2 = (x21 · · ·+ x2n)1/2, while ‖x‖∞ = sup(|x1|, . . . , |xn|).
14 Notice that models trained with adversarial samples generated
by the infinity norm give better robustness (Madry et al. 2017).
Table 1. Results presented in Sec. 3 considering a classical train-
ing of Inception like models as one for reference Iref and four
twins I0 -I3 (Tab. A1), and a completely different CNN model
(Tab. A2). These five alternate models are used to process ad-
versarial samples of the Iref model. The three variables (bias,
σmad, and the fraction of outliers η) are computed from the
δz = (zphot−zspec)/(1+zspec) distributions. The true bias value
should be multiplied by 10−4, similarly the σmad should be mul-
tiplied by 10−3 and η is expressed in percentage. The results are
presented for non perturbed images as well as all the investigated
adversarial image generators as Fast Sign Gradient Method and
Projected Gradient Descent, considering by default the infinity
norm, except a the last part of the table where the L2 norm is
applied. In this later case, the ε of Eq. 9 is ε∗ × (2n/epi)1/2 with
n = 642 to take into account the difference of ε-ball volumes
between the L2 and infinity norm. Notice, for adversarial attack
results, the bias values are not shown as they are not relevant
since the gaussian-like distribution of δz is no more preserved.
Models (images) bias (×10−4) σmad (×10−3) η (%)
Iref (non perturbed) 0.3 11 1
ε = 10−2, Single FSGM
Iref – 66 42
I0 -I3 (Iref adv) – [63, 68] [40, 43]
CNN (Iref adv) – 76 49
ε = 10−2, PGD, α = 10−3, niter = 10
Iref – 82 59
I0 -I3 (Iref adv) – [76, 78] [52, 55]
ε∗ = 10−2, PGD L2-norm, α = 10−3, niter = 40
Iref – 79 57
I0 -I3 (Iref adv) – [77, 79] [53, 55]
and η variables remain unchanged), while if ε = 0.1 then the
σMAD is increased by 50% and the number of outliers is mul-
tiplied by 3. So, we have fixed ε = 0.01 to perform an FSGM
attack on Iref. The results of such attack are displayed both
in Fig. 4 that can be compared to Fig. 3 and in Tab. 1 (line
”ε = 10−2, Single FSGM”). On a single image, Fig. 5 shows
the kind of perturbation generated by such attack.
As one clearly can appreciate, the very small perturba-
tion generated by the attack has dramatic impacts on the
photo-z predictions. But more than that, in Tab. 1, one can
see that the adversarial sample of the reference Inception
model impact not only other Inception models trained with
different seeds as well as different training sets, noted I0 -
I3, but also the different CNN model. Some remarks can be
drawn from this attack experiment: first, adversarial samples
of one model also affect other models which implies by conse-
quence that one cannot use several models to combine their
results to cancel this underlying systematic error; second,
the adversarial samples of one type of model architecture
also affect other model architectures. The later remark has
been identified in reference (Szegedy et al. 2013) and allows
one for some applications to put a corner in the defence of
a ML model (i.e. black box attack). So, all this tends to sug-
gest that adversarial samples are quite special samples as
they clearly break the traditional estimation of the general-
isation power of a model using test and validation samples.
The first reaction which was probably a common sense
when these adversarial samples were discovered in the ML
world, relied on the fact that the FSGM generated perturba-
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Figure 4. Same kind of histograms (same binning) of Fig. 3 but
after a FSGM attack with ε = 0.01.
tions are so special that the probability of occurrence should
be close to 0. But, this is not so simple even if we exclude
malicious intent in this work. First, the level of the FSGM
perturbation is so tiny that one cannot totally exclude that
such perturbation could not be made during the processing
of the different codes involved in a image treatment pipeline
(i.e. CCD pixel correction, deflating, de-biasing, calibration,
stacking, resampling, cosmic tracks removal and so on15)
even if these codes are very sophisticated, especially if the
experimental set-up evolves in time or if the observation
conditions are not 100% of perfect photometric nights. Al-
though, one can argue that these artefacts can be well mas-
tered thanks to the long experience accumulate in image
treatments. Second, intrinsically these adversarial samples
reveal a weakness of the training and also probably of the
model design. However, in the Section 4 we show how one
can take advantage of the adversarial generation to perform
a new training.
3.4 The PGD multi-steps generator
Before exploring the adversarial samples benefit, let us ex-
plore an other attack method which generalises in a simple
manner the FSGM one. In fact, the δ∗ expression Eq. 5 is
only exact in the linear case where fθ=(w,b)(x) = w
Tx + b
(Goodfellow et al. 2014), even if this solution is nicely very
effective as we have experienced. In the non-linear general
15 See for instance the different steps of the pipeline detailled in
reference Bosch et al. (2018).
Figure 5. Example of the impact of a FGSM attack (ε = 10−2).
From top to bottom: on the 1st line are displayed the 5 filter
frames of an non perturbed original/reference image (x); on the
2nd line the corresponding frames of the perturbation δ∗(x) mag-
nified by a factor 100 to be visible; on the 3rd line for the sake of
completeness are shown the results x+ δ∗(x); on the 4th line are
shown the horizontal slices at the vertical middles of the 5 frames
from x in blue and x+ δ∗(x) in red, notice in the left most panel
that the perturbation as expected is far smaller than the back-
ground level; on the last line are shown in blue and red curves the
predicted redshift p.d.f for the non perturbed and the perturbed
image as well as the blue and red vertical dashed lines correspond-
ing to the zphot estimations as weighted means of the bin centre
locations, and the black vertical dashed line corresponding to the
zspec ”true” redshift value. The color scale is common to all the
filter frames.
case, one needs to use an algorithm to get an approximated
solution of Eq. 4. To do so, one can use a hill climbing algo-
rithm. After an initialisation phase δ = δ0, one performs a
certain number of iterations (niter) to update δ as followed:
δ ← δ + argmax
‖u‖≤α
[
uT .∇δ`(fθ(x+ δ), z)
]
(6)
which in case of the infinity norm leads to
δ ← P∞ε [δ + α sign(∇δ`(fθ(x+ δ), z))] (7)
with α a learning rate different from the one used for the θ
minimisation part and with P∞ε the projection on the ε-L∞
ball such that ‖δ‖∞ ≤ ε. As one recognises, in some sense,
the method applies iteratively an FSGM attack with a small
step size α decoupled from the ε value. In the literature, this
method is part of a series known as Projected Descend Gra-
dient attacks (PGD). Notice that a refinement of the above
method consists of randomly initialise δ0 in the ε-L∞ ball,
however it has shown very little impact in our numerical ex-
perimental cases. There exists other methods to solve Eq. 4,
one is using a neural network which learns how to generate
adversarial samples (Jang et al. 2019).
Considering niter = 10, Tab. 1 presents the results of
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Figure 6. Pattern of a PGD adversarial iterative attack with
ε = 10−2 operating on the same original image of Fig. 5 (with
the same LUT). By comparison, one can see that such iterative
method leads to smoother pattern.
the PGD attacks conditioned by α = ε/10 both on the ref-
erence Inception model as well as its four twins I0-I3. See
Fig. 6 to have an idea of the perturbation pattern (i.e. δ)
generated by the PGD generator method. As anticipated,
greater is the number of iterations, greater is the negative
impact on the photo-z prediction. Although the effect is not
proportional to the number of iterations as using niter = 20
yields to an increase by 10% of the σMAD value and the
number of outliers. One notices that the FSGM method, in
a single step, already points towards the weakness of the
network and the training.
Before diving into the robust training algorithm, for the
sake of completeness, let us investigate what happens if we
use the L2 norm instead of the infinity norm. The δ
∗ solution
Eq. 7 is replaced by:
δ ← P2ε
[
δ + α
∇δ`(fθ(x+ δ), z)
‖`(fθ(x+ δ), z)‖2
]
(8)
where the projection P2ε on the ε-L2 ball is defined according
to
P2ε (x) = ε x
max(ε, ‖x‖2) . (9)
The results on the reference Inception and its four twins are
written on the last lines of Tab. 1. Notice that to conduct
such numerical experiment with L2 norm in a comparable
manner to the infinity norm, one needs to scale ε according
to the change of ε-ball volume between the two norms, and
to get an similar impact on the photo-z prediction, we were
forced to push the number of iterations up to niter = 40. At
this price, L2 norm can also clearly lead to negative impact
on the photo-z predictions and the pattern of the pertur-
bation is little sparser than with the infinity norm. But,
this norm is significantly more time consuming with a not
so different behaviour compared to the FSGM or the PGD
methods. So, it will not be used hereafter in the rest of this
article.
4 ADVERSARIAL TRAINING
4.1 The algorithm
In the previous section, we have shown that a simple ad-
versarial sample generator, i.e. the FSGM attack with very
small ε value far below the image background, can lead to
dramatic impact on the photo-z predictions, even if the In-
ception model has been correctly trained, in a classical sense.
At this stage, one may just forget this adversarial samples
advocating a very unlucky probability to occur. But as we
have argued, one may have a more proactive attitude taking
as fact that the model training as a certain amount of weak-
ness due to our inability to understand the exact essence
of the features that CNNs are really capturing (Ilyas et al.
2019). Even if in photo-z prediction domain, the security is
not engaged as it can be the case in cryptography or au-
tonomous vehicle for instance, we envisage the second at-
titude, especially because we can strengthen the training.
Algorithm 1 Adversarial training
1: Choose adversarial samples fraction and the attack gen-
erator (FSGM/PGD, ε, α, number of iterations)
2: Do θ (model weights) initialisation
3: for all mini-batch Btrain do
4: g ← 0 . loss gradient w.r.t θ
5: for all (x, z) ∈ Btrain do
6: if x counts for an adversarial sample then, according
to initial generator choice, find δ∗:
7: δ∗ ← ε sign (∇δ`(fθ(x+ δ), z))] . (FSGM)
8: δ ← P∞ε [δ + α sign(∇δ`(fθ(x+ δ), z))] . (PGD)
9: else
10: δ∗ ← 0
11: g ← g +∇θ`(fθ(x+ δ∗), z) . Update loss gradient
12: θ ← θ − α g|Btrain| . Update model weights
Then, let us elaborate a new training algorithm. In fact
to minimize the empirical adversarial risk (Eq. 3), one can
use a gradient descent method similar to Eq. 2 but adapted
to the adversarial empirical risk. This would lead to the fol-
lowing natural modified version:
θt+1 = θt
− α 1|Btrain|
∑
(x,z)∼Btrain
∇θ
[
max
‖δ‖≤ε
`(fθ(x+ δ), z)
]
θ=θt
.
(10)
However, there are two remarks that can be raised: the first
one concerns the method to compute the gradient regarding
the maximisation inner problem, the other one pinpoints
the fact that only adversarial samples are considered for the
loss computation. Concerning the gradient computation, the
difficulty is bypassed as followed: in a convex problem under
some mathematical hypothesis, one can use the J. Danksin’s
theorem (Danskin 1966) which yields the simple result:
∇θ
[
max
‖δ‖≤ε
`(fθ(x+ δ), z)
]
= ∇θ `(fθ(x+ δ∗), z) (11)
with δ∗ the solution of the maximisation problem16, but it is
also used even if the convexity is not guaranteed, as exper-
imentally it gives satisfactory numerical results.The second
point has been discussed in (Kurakin et al. 2016), and it re-
sults that a mixture of unperturbed samples and adversar-
ial samples is more effective. The introduction of adversarial
samples acts like a regularisation term (Finlay et al. 2018;
Bietti et al. 2018).
So, with the tools developped in the previous section,
we can set-up a new training algorithm (alg. 1) where af-
ter choosing the fraction of adversarial samples that pop-
ulate each training mini-batch, one computes δ∗ either by
using FSGM one-step method or by using the PGD itera-
tive method. Then, one updates the gradients involved in
16 Such theorem is used rigorously in reference (Ilyas et al. 2019).
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Table 2. Results after an adversarial training (alg. 1) of an In-
ception model using 100k images (non perturbed) among which
a certain fraction (fa) are perturbed using a FSGM method with
ε = 10−2. For each fa value, are presented the values of the
bias, the σMAD and η as for Tab. 1 for the cases of ’non per-
turbed/perturbed’ images obtained with the same attack that has
been used for the training. For the special case where fa = 0%,
are reminded the values presented in Tab. 1 to ease the compari-
son and the bias value obtained with perturbed images are noted
for completeness.
fraction of adv. bias (×10−4) σmad (×10−3) η (%)
0% −0.3/−105 11/66 1/42
5% −20/−40 11/9 1/4
10% 40/−25 11/8 1/2
20% −6/23 11/8 1/1
the gradient descent step to find the loss minimum with re-
spect to the model weights (θ). This schema is rather simple
and for instance the last step (12) is usually taken in charge
by more sophisticated algorithms already used in classical
training, i.e. SGD, Adam, and so on, with for instance mo-
mentum memory and weight decay. Moreover, the attack
generators listed are only those presented in the previous
section, and for other applications they can be modified on
purpose.
4.2 Training with FSGM adversarial samples
The results obtained after an adversarial training of an In-
ception model using (step (7) of alg. 1) a FSGM attack gen-
erator with ε = 10−2 are presented in Tab. 2. We have varied
the fraction (fa) of adversarial samples (i.e. perturbed im-
ages) among each batch training sets. It is quite striking that
a rather small fraction of adversarial samples as 5%, already
decreases the sensibility of the model to adversarial sam-
ples. Increasing the fraction fa leads to better results with
similar performances for non perturbed or perturbed im-
ages. We note however a worse bias compared to a classical
training using non perturbed images. Investigating different
optimiser codes and tweaking their own settings does not
change drastically this behaviour. In passing, we notice that
if the absolute values of the variables, notably the bias, are
varying with the optimiser settings, the relative behaviour
after training between non perturbed and perturbed images
remains unchanged.
4.3 The PGD adversarial samples
The results obtained in the previous section using the FSGM
adversarial sample generator seem encouraging, but the In-
ception model trained with fa = 20% or greater value of
FSGM adversarial samples has no increase of robustness
against the PGD attack using ε = 10−2 and niter = 10.
This weakness is even still present when we use during the
training a fraction of adversarial samples generated by the
PGD iterative method. This problem has been identified in
reference (Kurakin et al. 2016) and an explanation has been
elaborated by the authors of (Madry et al. 2017). In sum-
mary, they show that around a given sample x, the decision
boundary should be modified in a complex manner in such a
Table 3. Results of modified version (see text) of the Inception
baseline model (Tab. A1) trained with 50% of PDG adversarial
samples (ε = 10−2 and niter = 10) and 50% of non perturbed
samples. To ease the comparison, we have reported from Tab. 1
the result obtained with the Iref model. For each variables (bias,
σmad and η) are given the results considering non perturbed sam-
ples, samples generated by FSGM method (ε = 10−2) and sam-
ples generated by the PGD method used for training.
Model bias (×10−4) σmad (×10−3) η (%)
Iref 0.3/–/– 11/66/82 1/42/59
I(modified) −21/− 32/− 32 15/24/25 2/6/6
way that the perturbed samples (x+ δ∗) are correctly clas-
sified. This is a sort of local underfitting problem. To do so,
obtaining a stronger robustness against PGD iterative per-
turbations requires at least a model with a larger capacity.
Considering the Inception architecture (Tab. A1), to
get a larger capacity is not just a matter of increasing the
number of model parameters (i.e. the length of the θ vector).
For instance, by increasing the output size of the first fully
connected layer, that is to say the ’fc0’ layer and accordingly
the input size of the ’fc1’ layer (Tab. A1), from 1096 to
2000 neurons, leads to a new CNN network with 48 722 852
parameters compared to the original Inception model with
27 596 372 parameters. However, this larger network has
no better robustness against PGD attack. It is not neither
a matter of increasing the depth of the convolution part.
For instance, we have double the number of ’i3’ inception
cells without any success of increasing the robustness of the
modified model. The only way we have found to manage
a better robustness is by increasing the number of features
entering the classifier, that is to say the input size of the ’fc0’
layer. For instance, we have increased the output size of the
’i4.s2 2’ layer from 128 to 256, then the ’fc0’ input length has
been increased from 22273 to 38657, leading a model with
45 720 660 parameters. Pushing further the output size of
the ’i4.s2 2’ layer does not change the conclusions.
The results are shown in Tab. 3 with fa = 50%. Clearly
we have gained in robustness with comparable resistance
against FSGM and PGD adversarial sample generations.
But, in the same times we have degraded the results ob-
tained for normal samples which is not satisfactory. Actu-
ally, using fa ≤ 10% leads to results very similar the case
of Iref and increasing fa tends to increase the robustness
against adversarial PGD attack and simultaneously worsen
the results for normal samples. Notice that training with the
PGD generator niter parameter set to 30 do not change the
results. The problem is probably due to the architecture of
the Inception model. Although, testing over architecture is
beyond the purpose of this article and is postponed to fur-
ther studies. As suggested by reference (Yu et al. 2018), the
inspection of the loss landscape in the input space rather
than in the parameters space could be a diagnose of the sus-
ceptibility of a model to adversarial samples and a guideline
to propose an alternative.
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5 SUMMARY
In this article we have conducted some numerical experi-
ments with a specific convolutional neural network (i.e. the
Inception model) specially trained to predict galaxy redshift
from datacubes composed of SDSS multi-band photometric
imaging. We have shown that despite a good performance
using ”classical” training on normal images (i.e. non per-
turbed images), the model has a very poor generalisation
power when considering very tiny, although special, pertur-
bations of these images far below the background noise. This
is the quintessence of adversarial images to find the best per-
turbation that fool the network prediction. These perturbed
images reveal weaknesses that we think one should take care
about, especially to study the robustness of the model. No-
tice that we would have drawn the same conclusions with
an other CNN network, this is not specific to the Inception
model.
Following ML developments on this subject, we have
presented a simple algorithm for adversarial training (alg. 1)
that injects during the training phase a fraction of adversar-
ial images. This tends to strengthen the model against those
adversarial images without degrading to much the results on
normal images. This is especially efficient considering Fast
Sign Gradient Method to generate adversarial images and
we have shown that the present Inception model can be well
retrained. But, still the model does not master more aggres-
sive adversarial generators such as the Projected Gradient
Descent iterative methods. We have tried different modifi-
cations of the model to enlarge its capacity and found that
increasing the number of features entering the classifier part
of the network is the only way to get a better robustness to
PGD generated samples, but it is at the price of the degrada-
tion of the redshift predictions with non perturbed images
which is not satisfactory. This might be the sign that the
Inception model architecture is not well adapted to fight
against such attack. However, we note that the adversarial
training alg. 1 may also be improved to perform better inner
maximisation, for instance using a network specially trained
to generate adversarial samples (Jang et al. 2019). This is
postponed to further studies.
As final remarks, we want to point that the sensitivity
to adversarial samples is neither restricted to photometric
redshift predictions and the other usages of neural networks
in the different fields of image based analysis should be ad-
dressed, nor a specificity of convolutional neural networks
as tree-based models like Decision Trees, Gradient Boosted
DT, Random Forests may also be affected as described in
reference (Chen et al. 2019).
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APPENDIX A: INCEPTION AND CNN
ARCHITECTURES
In this appendix, we give a more advanced description of
the different layers of the two models used in this article:
the Inception CNN used by (Pasquet et al. 2019) (Tab. A1),
and a simpler CNN architecture (Tab. A2).
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Table A1. Inception scheme with a total number of trainable parameters 27 596 372. Kernel sizes of convolution layers are detailed
as well as padding if not 1x1. ’pool0’ are average pooling layers with possibly associated padding layers. Concatenation of the different
layers are mentioned in inception cells (’i0’,...,’i4’) as well as the first fully connected layer (’fc0’) with ’ebv’ information added. All
the ’s1 0’, ’s1 2’, ’s1 1’, ’s2 2’ layers share the same convolutional structure. The tensor dimensions follow the pyTorch convention
Channel×Height×Width for non-fully connected layers for which flatten tensors are used.
name input shape output shape nb params Comments
conv0 (5, 64, 64) (64, 64, 64) 8128 kernel=(5, 5), padding=(2, 2)
pool0 (64, 64, 64) (64, 32, 32) 0 average
i0.s1 0 (64, 32, 32) (48, 32, 32) 3168 kernel=(1, 1)
i0.s2 0 (48, 32, 32) (64, 32, 32) 27776 kernel=(3, 3)
i0.s1 2 (64, 32, 32) (48, 32, 32) 3168 kernel=(1, 1)
i0.pool0 (48, 33, 33) (48, 32, 32) 0
i0.s1 1 (64, 32, 32) (48, 32, 32) 3168 kernel=(1, 1)
i0.s2 1 (48, 32, 32) (64, 32, 32) 76928 kernel=(5, 5), padding=(2, 2)
i0.s2 2 (64, 32, 32) (64, 32, 32) 4224 kernel=(1, 1)
i0 (64, 32, 32) (240, 32, 32) 118432 concat i0.(s2 2, s2 1, s2 0, pool0)
i1.s1 0 (240, 32, 32) (64, 32, 32) 15488
i1.s2 0 (64, 32, 32) (92, 32, 32) 53176
i1.s1 2 (240, 32, 32) (64, 32, 32) 15488
i1.pool0 (64, 33, 33) (64, 32, 32) 0
i1.s1 1 (240, 32, 32) (64, 32, 32) 15488
i1.s2 1 (64, 32, 32) (92, 32, 32) 147384
i1.s2 2 (240, 32, 32) (92, 32, 32) 22264
i1 (240, 32, 32) (340, 32, 32) 269288 concat i1.(s2 2, s2 1, s2 0, pool0)
pool0 (340, 32, 32) (340, 16, 16) 0
i2.s1 0 (340, 16, 16) (92, 16, 16) 31464
i2.s2 0 (92, 16, 16) (128, 16, 16) 106240
i2.s1 2 (340, 16, 16) (92, 16, 16) 31464
i2.pool0 (92, 17, 17) (92, 16, 16) 0
i2.s1 1 (340, 16, 16) (92, 16, 16) 31464
i2.s2 1 (92, 16, 16) (128, 16, 16) 294656
i2.s2 2 (340, 16, 16) (128, 16, 16) 43776
i2 (340, 16, 16) (476, 16, 16) 539064 concat i2.(s2 2, s2 1, s2 0, pool0)
i3.s1 0 (476, 16, 16) (92, 16, 16) 43976
i3.s2 0 (92, 16, 16) (128, 16, 16) 106240
i3.s1 2 (476, 16, 16) (92, 16, 16) 43976
i3.pool0 (92, 17, 17) (92, 16, 16) 0
i3.s1 1 (476, 16, 16) (92, 16, 16) 43976
i3.s2 1 (92, 16, 16) (128, 16, 16) 294656
i3.s2 2 (476, 16, 16) (128, 16, 16) 61184
i3 (476, 16, 16) (476, 16, 16) 594008 concat i3.(s2 2, s2 1, s2 0, pool0)
pool0 (476, 16, 16) (476, 8, 8) 0
i4.s1 0 (476, 8, 8) (92, 8, 8) 43976
i4.s2 0 (92, 8, 8) (128, 8, 8) 106240
i4.s1 2 (476, 8, 8) (92, 8, 8) 43976
i4.pool0 (92, 9, 9) (92, 8, 8) 0
i4.s2 2 (476, 8, 8) (128, 8, 8) 61184
i4 (476, 8, 8) (348, 8, 8) 255376 concat i4.(s2 2, s2 0, pool0)
fc0 (22273) (1096) 24412304 concat (i0,i1,i2,i3,i4, ’ebv’)
fc1 (1096) (1096) 1202312
fc2 (1096) (180) 197460
This paper has been typeset from a TEX/LATEX file prepared by the author.
12 J.E Campagne
Table A2. CNN scheme with a total number of trainable parameters 13 461 008. Kernel sizes of convolution layers are detailed as well
as padding if not 1x1. ’pool0’ are average pooling layers with possibly associated padding layers. The last convolutional-polling associated
layers (’pool2’)’ output is concatenated with the ’ebv’ information added to feed the first fully connected layer. The tensor conventions
follow those describes in Tab. A1.
name input shape output shape nb params Comments
conv0 (5, 64, 64) (64, 64, 64) 8064 kernel=(5, 5), padding=(2, 2)
pool0 (64, 64, 64) (64, 32, 32) 0 average
conv1 (64, 32, 32) (92, 34, 34) 53084 kernel=(3, 3), padding=(2, 2)
pool1 (92, 34, 34) (92, 17, 17) 0 average
conv2 (92, 17, 17) (128, 19, 19) 106112 kernel=(3, 3), padding=(2, 2)
pool2 (128, 19, 19) (128, 10, 10) 0 average
fc0 (12801) (1024) 13109248 concat (pool2, ’ebv’)
fc1 (1024) (180) 184500
